218 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
218 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# AGENTS.md
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Single-package Pyramid 2.0 blog app (`ctp_blogr`). Python 3.14, SQLite, Jinja2, WTForms,
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SQLAlchemy 2.1, `pyramid_tm` transactions. Sign-in is Google OAuth only: Authlib
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protocol/crypto primitives plus `joserfc` and `urllib.request` for HTTP. There are no
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passwords anywhere — no password column, no password form fields, no local credential
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path. UI strings, comments, and flash messages are **French**; match that when editing
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views/templates.
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## Environment
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The venv is the **parent** directory (`/Users/phuoc/pyramid2`), not inside the repo.
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`ctp_blogr` is installed there in editable mode, so run commands from the repo root with
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the venv's python (already on PATH as `python`). The venv is shared and also carries a
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stale editable install of a `wiki_test` project whose source is gone — don't `pip install`
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into it casually, and don't assume the venv contents match this repo's `setup.py`.
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No linter, formatter, type-checker, pre-commit, CI workflow, or task runner exists.
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Don't invent one; don't claim you ran one.
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## Commands
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```bash
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ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=... ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=... pserve development.ini # waitress on localhost:9280 + debugtoolbar
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ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=... ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=... pserve production.ini # binds *:9280, url_scheme https
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ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=... ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=... pshell development.ini # preloaded: request, tm, dbsession, models
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python -m pytest # 34 tests, all offline (2 in tests.py + 32 in test_oauth.py)
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python -m pytest ctp_blogr/tests.py::TestMyViewSuccessCondition # single test/class
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ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=... ENV_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=... python -c "from pyramid.paster import get_app; get_app('development.ini')" # boot check
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```
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- `pserve`, `pshell`, and the boot check all refuse to start without both env vars:
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`__init__.py` raises `ConfigurationError` with a French message naming the missing ones.
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PasteDeploy `%(ENV_...)s` interpolation does **not** work (`plaster_pastedeploy` 1.0.1
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ships no `os.environ` support), so the app reads `os.environ` itself; an `.ini` value,
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if set, wins over the environment.
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- `pytest.ini` sets `testpaths = ctp_blogr` and `python_files = test*.py`, so a new test
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file must be named `test*.py` inside the package to be collected.
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- **`coverage` is broken**: `.coveragerc` still says `source = pyramid_blogr` (old package
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name). `coverage run -m pytest` collects nothing. Fix the name before trusting any
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coverage number; don't report "no coverage" as a finding.
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- `initialize_ctp_blogr_db` is declared in `setup.py` but `ctp_blogr/scripts/initialize_db.py`
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does not exist (only `scripts/__init__.py`) — the console script fails with
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`ModuleNotFoundError`. There is no working DB-init command.
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## Architecture / wiring
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- `ctp_blogr/__init__.py::main` is the PasteDeploy app factory. Auth is Pyramid's
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`SessionAuthenticationPolicy` + `ACLAuthorizationPolicy` with
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`root_factory='ctp_blogr.security.RootFactory'`. The whole ACL is 3 lines in `security.py`:
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`view` → `Authenticated`, `manage` → `group:administrators`, then `DENY_ALL`.
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- The session factory is explicit: 85-char secret, `timeout=36000` (10 h; the
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`SignedCookieSessionFactory` default is 1200 s / 20 min), `httponly=True` always,
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`secure=True` only when `session.cookie_secure = true` (set in production.ini).
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- Identity is the **email**, stored as `request.authenticated_userid` (set via `remember()`
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in the OAuth callback).
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- **Admin is not a DB flag.** `services/user.py::make_groupfinder(admin_emails)` returns the
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auth callback built from the `auth.admin_emails` setting in the `.ini` files. It must
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**not** query the DB: `pyramid_tm` resolves `request.authenticated_userid` inside
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`manager.begin()`, so a DB query there would run per request inside the transaction and
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any DB error would 500 every route including `/login`. Falsy userid → `None`, admin
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email → `['group:administrators']`, anything else → `[]` (logged in, no manage rights).
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Callers test `'group:administrators' in request.effective_principals` (views and
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templates). `/users` and `/user_edit` require `manage`; `blog_edit`, `tag_edit`, and
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`/tags` require only `view`.
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- `services/google_oauth.py::GoogleOAuth` is registered as an **attribute**,
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`config.registry.google_oauth` (read as `request.registry.google_oauth`). Pyramid's
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`Registry` subclasses `dict` but has no `__getattr__`, so a `registry['google_oauth']`
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dict-key assignment would be invisible to the views. It resolves
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`authorization_endpoint` / `token_endpoint` / `jwks_uri` / `issuer` from the Google
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discovery document, cached, plus a cached JWKS (`CACHE_TTL = 3600`, counted by
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`jwks_fetches`). Authlib has no Pyramid integration, so the app owns `state` / PKCE /
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`nonce` itself; `authorize_redirect` / `save_authorize_data` are not used. Authlib is
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used only for protocol primitives (`generate_token`, `create_s256_code_challenge`) and
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the 3 HTTP calls go through `urllib.request` — do **not** add `requests`
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(`authlib.integrations.requests_client` hard-imports it). `id_token` is verified with
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`joserfc`, not `authlib.jose`. Scope is `openid email` with no `hd` parameter (the
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second account is a personal Gmail address, so an `hd` lock would reject it).
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- Routes added: `login_google` = `/login/google`,
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`login_google_callback` = `/login/google/callback`.
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- The callback pops `state` / `nonce` / `code_verifier` from the session **before** the
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token exchange, and sets `request.environ['retry.attempts'] = attempt + 1` to declare
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itself the last attempt. Both are required: a `pyramid_retry` replay restarts from the
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original request cookie (which still carries `oauth_state`), which would re-send an
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already-consumed authorization code and fail `invalid_grant`.
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- Sign-in is gated on the `users` table (allowlist). No row is ever auto-created. Unknown
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email sets `request.response.status_int = 403` explicitly and renders
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`templates/denied.jinja2`, without raising `HTTPForbidden`. New template
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`denied.jinja2` renders the refusal in French.
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- The callback validates three ID-token claims before touching the allowlist, and each
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one is pinned by a test that fails if the guard is removed:
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- a missing `code` param is refused **before** any network call (`fetch_calls == 0`);
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- `email_verified` must be exactly `True`. The identity *is* the email, so accepting
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an unverified address would let an unverified Google account impersonate an
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allowlisted one. Google returns this claim; don't "simplify" the check away;
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- `sub` must be non-empty. Without it the matched row would get `google_sub = ''`,
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which both collides with the `UNIQUE` constraint and leaves the record rebindable
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by any other account presenting the same address.
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- `views/default.py::denied` is registered with `@view_config(context=HTTPForbidden, ...)`
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and sets a real 403. Unauthorized requests now return **HTTP 403 with the denied
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page** — assert 403 in tests, and don't assume 200 means "the page worked" when
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smoke-testing protected routes (`/users`, `/tags`, `/blog_edit/{id}`, `/tag_edit/{id}`,
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`/user_edit/{name}`).
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- `user_edit` is `permission='manage'` (any logged-in user could previously open or create
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fiches). The create-user branch (`name='0'`) is gone; unknown names flash
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"Utilisateur non trouvé" and redirect. `UserEditForm` (renamed from `UserCreateForm`)
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has only `id` + `name`, and the view deletes `form.name` (not `form.id`) before
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`populate_obj`, since the email is the identity.
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- Views bind to routes via `@view_config(route_name=...)`; routes are declared centrally in
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`routes.py`. Adding a URL means editing both.
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- `models/__init__.py` includes `pyramid_tm` + `pyramid_retry` and reifies `request.dbsession`.
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`settings['tm.manager_hook'] = 'pyramid_tm.explicit_manager'` is set there — removing it
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breaks commit/abort behaviour.
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- Write path: view → `request.dbsession.add(...)` → implicit commit by `pyramid_tm`. Do **not**
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call `commit()` yourself.
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- Query layer lives in `services/` (`BlogRecordService`, `UserService`, plus the Google
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collaborator) — all classmethods taking `request`. Keep DB access out of views.
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- Read filtering is duplicated per-method: anonymous users only ever see `status == 'publié'`
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(`by_criteria`, `by_tag`, `get_last_created`). `by_id` does **not** filter — any post is
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readable by direct URL. Preserve that asymmetry or you change access behaviour.
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- Post bodies are Markdown; `views/blog.py` runs `markdown.markdown(..., extensions=['footnotes'])`
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and rewrites `static/` → `<app_url>/static/` so relative image paths resolve.
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- Renderer strings are inconsistent on purpose-ish: most views use `'../templates/x.jinja2'`
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(relative to the package), but `default.py::user_edit` uses the asset spec
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`'ctp_blogr:templates/user_edit.jinja2'`. Both work; don't "normalize" one without
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checking the jinja2 search path.
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- `login.jinja2` has a single "Se connecter avec Google" control and no password markup;
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`layout.jinja2` shows the Utilisateurs nav item only for admins; the password-change nav
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item and the "Nouvel utilisateur" button are gone. `users.jinja2` is NULL-safe for
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`last_logged` (renders "jamais"); `user_edit.jinja2` shows the email readonly.
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- `forms.py` contains dead forms from another app (`HistoForm`, `AllocationForm`, `ActifForm`,
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`Actif2Form`) matching orphaned DB tables `histo`, `allocation`, `actifs`. Ignore them.
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## Database
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- **`ctp_blogr.sqlite` is committed and is the real dev database** (~99 posts, 8 tags; users
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are now `phuoc@caotek.fr` (admin, via the `.ini` setting) and `ctphuoc@gmail.com`
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(authenticated, no manage)). Both `development.ini` and `production.ini` point at it via
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`%(here)s`. `.gitignore` lists `*.sqlite`, but the file is already tracked, so the ignore
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rule does nothing — every write view's `pyramid_tm` commit is a real diff to review.
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- `users`: `password` dropped, `google_sub` added (nullable, UNIQUE), `name` still NOT NULL
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+ UNIQUE and now stores the email. `entries.creator` / `entries.editor` are `Unicode(255)`.
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- The DB contains an `alembic_version` table (rev `b8f8216d72c7`) but there is **no
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`alembic.ini` and no `migrations/` directory in this repo**. Alembic is installed in the
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venv, yet nothing here is wired to it. The OAuth schema changes were hand-applied SQL,
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so the schema cannot be regenerated.
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- **The DB file is the source of truth for schema.** Changing a model means: apply the
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equivalent `ALTER TABLE` to `ctp_blogr.sqlite` by hand, and tell the user migrations are
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missing rather than pretending `Base.metadata.create_all()` covers them. `create_all()` is
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only used by the in-memory test fixtures (`tests.py::BaseTest.init_database`,
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`test_oauth.py::demarrer`).
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- `Tags` is defined in `models/blog_record.py` but is **not** imported in `models/__init__.py`
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(only `User` and `BlogRecord` are, before `configure_mappers()`). It still works only because
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importing `blog_record` defines the class as a side effect. Import it explicitly if you touch
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mapper config.
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## Known-broken (verified, do not re-diagnose)
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- `views/default.py:18` — `home` hardcodes `BlogRecordService.by_id(request, 95)` and then reads
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`entry.title` / `entry.body` with no `None` check. The home page raises `AttributeError` on any
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database where id 95 doesn't exist (e.g. a freshly created one). `home.jinja2:18` hardcodes the
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same id for the "select another drawing" link.
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- `services/blog_record.py` uses `query.get(_id)` — legacy SQLAlchemy 1.x API. Works on 2.1.3 but
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emits `LegacyAPIWarning`; prefer `session.get(Model, id)` when touching that line.
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- `routes.py:5` — `'/blog/{id:\d+}/{slug}'` is a non-raw string, so Python 3.12+ emits
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`SyntaxWarning: "\d" is an invalid escape sequence`. Prefix with `r` if you edit it.
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- `models/meta.py` uses `sqlalchemy.ext.declarative.declarative_base` (`MovedIn20Warning`).
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- Draft leak in `by_id` (no status filter) and the `LIKE` search leak in `by_criteria`
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(anonymous search matches drafts/privates, only the display is filtered elsewhere) are
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pre-existing and deliberately not fixed by the OAuth work.
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- Any logged-in user (including the non-admin account) can edit and delete ANY post,
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because `security.py` grants `view` to every authenticated user and `blog_edit` /
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`tag_edit` only require `view`. Pre-existing, deliberately unchanged (README documents an
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"admin ou redacteur" role). Pinned by
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`test_DEFAUT_connu_un_utilisateur_non_administrateur_peut_modifier_un_billet`.
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- `UserService.delete` has no FK cascade: deleting a user leaves their email stranded in
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`entries.creator` / `entries.editor`.
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- Pre-existing DB defect, not caused by the OAuth work: `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` aborts
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with "foreign key mismatch" because `fk_allocation_classe_actifs` references
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`actifs.classe`, which is neither UNIQUE nor a PK.
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- No CSRF protection on the pre-existing POST views, and `logout` is a state-mutating GET.
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Accepted risk, not fixed. Pyramid 2.1's cookie session exposes `new_csrf_token()` /
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`get_csrf_token()` if someone wants to add it.
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- Identity lives entirely in the signed client-side cookie (no server-side session
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backend). Payload is ~250 bytes against Pyramid's hard 4064-byte limit, so the only
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growth vector is unbounded flash accumulation.
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## Testing
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`ctp_blogr/tests.py` still has only its two original duplicate tests (both assert the same
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success case; `test_failing_view` is a copy-paste of `test_passing_view`). New
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`ctp_blogr/test_oauth.py` adds 32 tests on a real WSGI app over `sqlite:///:memory:` with
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the Google collaborator faked and sockets blocked by an autouse fixture — 34 passing in
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total, all fully offline. Tests named `DEFAUT_*` pin known defects on purpose (observed
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behaviour, not desired). `BaseTest` wraps its session in `transaction.manager`, aborting in
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teardown. `WebTest` is installed; `test_oauth.py` shows the pattern for new view tests.
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## Conventions
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- 4-space indent, no type hints, no docstrings on views. Comments are frequently French and
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slightly garbled English/French mixes (`# interdire le car '/' dans le titre`) — leave them.
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- `@view_config` renderer paths and view return dicts follow the existing pattern; views return
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plain dicts consumed by the matching Jinja2 template.
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- Form submission is detected by string key presence: `if 'form.submitted' in request.params`,
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plus `'form.update_created'` and `'form.deleted'` for the extra buttons. Buttons must set
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`name="form.submitted"` etc.
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- `del form.id` (blog/tag forms) / `del form.name` (`user_edit`) before `populate_obj` is a
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deliberate guard against overwriting the primary key / identity. Keep it.
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- `/blog_bytag/{tag}/{retour}` — `retour` is a **route name** (`request.route_url(retour)`), not a
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URL. Callers pass e.g. `retour='home'`.
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- Currently on branch `feat/google-oauth`, uncommitted, nothing pushed (`master` tracks
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`origin/master` at the same commit, so branch choice is still not settled). A verified
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pre-migration DB backup exists outside the tree at
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`/var/folders/cm/x5cx1bfd749gxd1x_zt6bvp40000gn/T/opencode/ctp_blogr-backup-20261005-202240.sqlite`
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(`PRAGMA integrity_check` returns `ok`); restore with `cp` over `ctp_blogr.sqlite`.
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Ask before creating branches, committing, or pushing to the self-hosted
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`https://git.caotek.fr/phuoc/ctp_blogr.git`. Commit only when asked.
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